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On Universality of Classical Probability with Contextually Labeled Random Variables
Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov1, ∗ and Maria Kon1
1Purdue University
One can often encounter claims that classical (Kolmogorovian) probability theory cannot handle,
or even is contradicted by, certain empirical findings or substantive theories. This note joins sev-
eral previous attempts to explain that these claims are unjustified, illustrating this on the issues of
(non)existence of joint distributions, probabilities of ordered events, and additivity of probabilities.
The specific focus of this note is on showing that the mistakes underlying these claims can be pre-
cluded by labeling all random variables involved contextually. Moreover, contextual labeling also
enables a valuable additional way of analyzing probabilistic aspects of empirical situations: deter-
mining whether the random variables involved form a contextual system, in the sense generalized
from quantum mechanics. Thus, to the extent the Wang-Busemeyer QQ equality for the question
order effect holds, the system describing them is noncontextual. The double-slit experiment and its
behavioral analogues also turn out to form a noncontextual system, having the same probabilistic
format (cyclic system of rank 4) as the one describing spins of two entangled electrons.
KEYWORDS: classical probability, contextuality, contextual labeling, double-slit experiment,
question-order effects, random variables.
In the literature on foundations of quantum physics (Ac-
cardi, 1982; Feynman, 1951; Feynman, Leighton, & Sands,
1975; Khrennikov, 2009b) and, more recently, psychology
(Aerts, 2009, 2014; Broekaert, Basieva, Blasiak, & Pothos,
2017; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Moreira & Wichert, 2016;
Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013), one can encounter statements
that classical (Kolmogorovian) probability theory does not
have adequate conceptual means to handle (sometimes,
even, is contradicted by) this or that empirical fact.
Three of the most widespread assertions of this kind are
as follows:
Statement 1: Classical probability requires that certain
(e.g., Bell-type) inequalities hold for certain systems
of random variables, but we know from quantum me-
chanics and from behavioral experiments that they
may be violated.
Statement 2: In classical probability, the joint occurrence
of two events is commutative, but we know from
quantum mechanics and from behavioral experiments
that the order of two events generally matters for
their joint probability.
Statement 3: Classical probability is additive (equiva-
lently, obeys the law of total probability), but we
know from quantum mechanics and from behavioral
experiments that this additivity (the law of total
probability) can be violated.
This note has three objectives: (1) to show that the three
statements above are based on misidentification of the ran-
dom variables involved, due to ignoring their inherently
contextual labeling; (2) to show that contextual labeling
is a principled way to “automatically” ensure correct ap-
plicability of classical probability theory to an empirical
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situation; and (3) to demonstrate how the use of contex-
tual labeling enables so-called contextuality analysis of sys-
tems of random variables, a relatively new form of prob-
abilistic analysis of considerable interest in empirical ap-
plications. Contextual labeling of random variables is the
departing principle of Khrennikov’s Växjö Model (Khren-
nikov, 2009a) and of the Contextuality-by-Default theory
(Dzhafarov, 2017; Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017;
Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2015, 2016a, 2017a, 2017b;
Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Cervantes, 2016).
Let us preamble this discussion by stating our view of
classical probability theory (CPT), one that we are not pre-
pared to defend in complete generality, confining ourselves
instead to merely illustrating it on the three statements
above. This view is that CPT, on a par with classical logic
and set theory, is a universal abstract mathematical theory.
As an abstract mathematical theory, it does not make em-
pirically testable predictions, because of which it cannot be
contradicted by any empirical observation. As a universal
theory, for any empirical situation, it has conceptual means
to adequately describe anything that can be qualified as this
situation’s probabilistic features (in the frequentist sense).
Moreover, as a conceptual tool, in the same way as classical
logic and set theory, it is indispensable and irreplaceable in
dealing with probabilistic problems: at the end, the results
of any non-classical probabilistic analysis have to be formu-
lated in terms of classical (frequentist) probabilities, distri-
butions, and random variables. However, when applied to
an empirical situation, CPT can (even must) be comple-
mented by special-purpose computations identifying some
of the random variables, distributions, and probabilities in
this particular situation. To give a very simple example,
CPT provides methods for deriving probabilities of events
defined on the outcomes of rolling a die from a distribu-
tion of these outcomes, but it cannot predict this distribu-
tion. A special theory is needed to know, e.g., that if a die
is manufactured in a particular way, then the distribution
of its outcomes is uniform. We view quantum probability
as such a special-purpose theory complementing classical
probability. This mathematical formalism is indispensable
2in quantum mechanics and has significant achievements to
its credit in psychology (e.g., Wang & Busemeyer, 2013). It
can be formalized and presented as an abstract calculus al-
ternative to or even generalizing the calculus of CPT, in the
same way one can formalize a paraconsistent logic as a gen-
eralization of classical logic. However, just as one cannot
replace classical logic with paraconsistent logic in analyzing
anything, including the very paraconsistent logic itself, one
cannot dispense with classical probability when discussing
and analyzing quantum probability computations and re-
lating them to data.
This view is not entirely new. Ballentine (1986) defended
a similar position in essentially the same way we are do-
ing here. The difference is in that instead of using ran-
dom variables, Ballentine confined himself to a more lim-
ited language of events, and he used conditionalization in
place of the more general contextualization (Dzhafarov &
Kujala, 2014b; we discuss conditionalization in Section 3
below). Khrennikov (2009a), in describing his Växjö con-
textual model uses Ballentine’s conditional-probability no-
tation, but emphasizes that these are not conditional prob-
abilities of CPT. Rather he calls them “contextual probabil-
ities,” and explains that “contextual probability [...] is not
probability that an event, sayB, occurs under the condition
that another event, say C, has occurred. The contextual
probability is probability to get the result a = α under the
complex of physical conditions C” (Khrennikov, 2009a, p.
50). This seems to be the same as the contextual label-
ing used in the Contextuality-by-Default theory. A very
clear presentation of a position that is close to ours can be
found in the arguments presented in an internet discussion
by Tim Maudlin (2013).
The purpose of this paper is to achieve conceptual clar-
ity in understanding CPT, not to criticize specific authors
or papers. The latter is an ungrateful task, as most au-
thors’ positions are not entirely consistent, are subject to
(re)interpretations, and evolve over time. We cite specific
papers and occasionally provide quotes only to demonstrate
that a reasonable reader may interpret the positions they
entail in the spirit of the Statements 1-3 above. Thus,
Richard Feynman is often cited as arguing that classical
probability is not compatible with quantum mechanics (Ac-
cardi, 1982; Costantini, 1993; Khrennikov 2009b). This in-
terpretation is supported by Feynman’s speaking of “the
discovery that in nature the laws of combining probabil-
ities were not those of the classical probability theory of
Laplace” (Feynman, 1951, p. 533). However, one can also
find statements in Feynman’s writings that make his point
of view less than unequivocal. Thus, we read in the same
paper and on the same page that “the concept of proba-
bility is not altered in quantum mechanics. When I say
the probability of a certain outcome of an experiment is p
[...] no departure from the concept used in classical statis-
tics is required. What is changed, and changed radically, is
the method of calculating probabilities” (ibid). This quote
is consistent with treating quantum formalisms as special-
purpose computations embedded in CPT. We will return
to Feynman when discussing the double-slit experiment in
Section 3.
1. ON STATEMENT 1
“Classical probability requires that certain
(e.g., Bell-type) inequalities hold for certain
sets of random variables, but we know from
quantum mechanics and from behavioral exper-
iments that they may be violated.”
This view is commonly held in both physics and psychol-
ogy (Aerts, 2009; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Bruza, Kitto, Nel-
son, & McEvoy, 2009; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Filipp
& Svozil, 2005; Khrennikov, 2009b; Yearsley & Pothos,
2014). In particular, among those applying quantum prob-
ability to behavior and also treating quantum probability
theory as an alternative to CPT, there are claims that
Bell-type inequalities are violated in experiments involv-
ing combinations of concepts (Aerts & Sozzo, 2011; Buse-
meyer & Bruza, 2012) and memory (Bruza, Kitto, Nelson,
& McEvoy, 2009).
We will not recapitulate all the arguments related to
this issue, as they have been presented in many previ-
ous publications (Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017;
Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 2017a, 2017b;
Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015). We will use just one
familiar example. Let R1, R2, R3, R4 denote a set of bi-
nary (+1/− 1) random variables with known distributions
of (R1, R2), (R2, R3), (R3, R4), and (R4, R1). The nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a
quadruple of random variables is given by the CHSH/Fine
inequality (Bell, 1964; Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt,
1969; Fine, 1982):
max
j=1,...,4
∣∣∣∣∣
4∑
i=1
〈RiRi⊕1〉 − 2 〈RjRj⊕1〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2, (1)
where ⊕1 is cyclic shift 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 1, and 〈·〉 is
expectation. One can easily construct examples of distri-
butions of (Ri, Ri⊕1) for which this inequality is violated,
indicating that such R1, R2, R3, R4 do not exist (essentially
by the same logic as in determining that there are no four
numbers a, b, c, d with a = b, b = c, c = d, and d = a+ 1).
The problem arises when we are being told that the exis-
tence of such R1, R2, R3, R4 is predicted by quantum theory
and corroborated by experiment. If we believe this, viola-
tions of (1) should indeed mean that CPT is inadequate, if
not internally contradictory. We should not, however, be-
lieve this. R1, R2, R3, R4 in (1) are random variables in the
CPT sense; they are not within the language of quantum
theory. To decide what classical random variables should
describe outcomes of what quantum measurements, one
needs to go outside this theory. The general rule is that
a random variable is identified by what is being measured
and how it is being measured. The latter includes all condi-
tions under which the measurement is made, in particular,
all other measurements performed together with the given
one. In our example, the measurements are indicated by
star symbols in the following matrix:
3⋆ ⋆ c1
⋆ ⋆ c2
⋆ ⋆ c3
⋆ ⋆ c4
q1 q2 q3 q4
.
The row labels c1, . . . , c4 are called contexts, and here they
are defined by which two quantities are being measured
together: in c1 it is q1 and q2, in c2 it is q2 and q3, etc. In
behavioral science the quantities q1, . . . , q4 can be, e.g., four
Yes-No questions posed to a large number of people divided
into four groups: in the group c1 each person is asked q1
and q2, in the group c2 each person is asked q2 and q3, etc.
In quantum mechanics the matrix above could describe the
well-known EPR/Bell paradigm with two entangled spin-
half particles: q1 and q3 correspond to the two axes along
which Alice measures spins in her particle, while q2 and q4
correspond to the two axes analogously used by Bob in his
particle.
Let us use the notation Rji for the outcome of a measure-
ment of qi in context cj :
R11 R
1
2 c1
R22 R
2
3 c2
R3
3
R3
4
c3
R4
1
R4
4
c4
q1 q2 q3 q4
.
Since the values of Rii and R
i
i⊕1 are empirically paired (two
responses given by the same person, or the measurements
by Bob and Alice made simultaneously), the random vari-
ables in each row of the matrix are jointly distributed.
This is not true for measurements made in different con-
texts: their joint distribution is undefined, and we call them
stochastically unrelated (not to be confused with being
stochastically independent, which is a special case of being
jointly distributed). In particular, Rji and R
j′
i measuring
the same property qi in two different contexts are stochas-
tically unrelated. In the Kolmogorovian language, Rji and
Rj
′
i are defined on different domain probability spaces. It is
therefore impossible to say that Rji = R
j′
i , because equality
is a special case of joint distribution.
It is clear now that CPT imposes no constraints what-
ever on the row-wise joint distributions. The CHSH/Fine
inequality (1) cannot be derived for this matrix of contextu-
ally labelled random variables. However, it can be derived
as a solution for the following problem: find necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a jointly distributed
quadruple of random variables (S1, S2, S3, S4) such that
(Si, Si⊕1) has the same distribution as
(
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
)
, (2)
for i = 1, . . . , 4. Such a vector (S1, S2, S3, S4) is called
a “reduced coupling” of the stochastically unrelated pairs(
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
)
(Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016b).
The reduced coupling (S1, S2, S3, S4) is merely a shortcut
for describing a special case of what we call a C-coupling
(Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017; Dzhafarov & Ku-
jala, 2016a, 2017a, 2017b). C is some property of a pair of
random variables, and a C-coupling of the pairs
(
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
)
in our example is a jointly distributed octuple of ran-
dom variables
(
S1
1
, S1
2
, S2
2
, S2
3
, S3
3
, S3
4
, S4
4
, S4
1
)
such that, for
i = 1, . . . , 4,
(
Sii , S
i
i⊕1
)
has the same distribution as
(
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
)
, (3)
and, in addition,
(
Sii⊕1, S
i⊕1
i⊕1
)
satisfies property C. (4)
The reduced coupling is the one defined by C with the
meaning “are equal with probability 1” (applied to pairs of
random variables). More generally, in the Contextuality-
by-Default theory, C is chosen to mean “are equal with
maximal possible probability.” For this choice of C, the
criterion for the existence of a C-coupling is
maxj=1,...,4
∣∣∣∑4i=1
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
− 2
〈
RjjR
j
j⊕1
〉∣∣∣
≤ 2 +
∑4
i=1
∣∣〈Rii⊕1
〉
−
〈
Ri⊕1i⊕1
〉∣∣ ,
(5)
a useful generalization of CHSH/Fine inequality (1) (Dzha-
farov & Kujala, 2016a; Dzhafarov, Kujala, & Larsson, 2015;
Kujala & Dzhafarov, 2016; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson,
2015). A system of random variables for which a C-coupling
exists (does not exist) is called C-noncontextual (respec-
tively, C-contextual).1
That context is part of the identity of a random variable
is the departure point for the Contextuality-by-Default the-
ory, the term “identity” being understood in the Kolmogoro-
vian sense, as the measurable function from a domain prob-
ability space to a codomain measurable space (for detailed
explanations, see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a, 2017a). One
advantage provided by this contextual identification is that
it allows for the possibility that random variables measur-
ing the same property in different contexts, such as R1
2
and
R22 in our example, are differently distributed. This can
happen, e.g., if one of the two questions posed to a person
influences her response to the other question, or if Alice can
signal to Bob and thereby change his recordings. With non-
contextual labeling, such as R1, R2, R3, R4 in the opening
formulation, to express the same fact one would have to say
that R2 is differently distributed depending on whether “it”
is recorded together with R1 or R3. This is at best an abuse
of language, if not outright nonsensical, as the distribution
of R2 is part of its identity.
2. ON STATEMENT 2
“In classical probability the joint occurrence
of two events is commutative, but we know from
1 To avoid terminological confusion, in the Contextuality-by-Default
theory each random variable is contextually labeled (“by default”),
but a system of contextually labelled random variables can be C-
noncontextual or C-contextual.
4quantum mechanics and from behavioral exper-
iments that the order of two events generally
matters for their joint probability.”
Thus, we read in Trueblood and Busemeyer (2011) that
“the classical probability model has difficulty accounting
for order effects because the commutative property holds”
(p. 1527). And in Wang and Busemeyer (2015): “Classical
probability theory has difficulty explaining order effects be-
cause events are represented as sets and are commutative,
so the joint probability of events A and B is the same for
the order of ‘A and B’ and the order of ‘B and A’” (p. 2).
Quotes like these are numerous, but it should be noted that
Busemeyer and colleagues carefully qualify their criticism of
CPT. They acknowledge that models based on CPT can be
formulated for such empirical phenomena as order effects,
but their presentation implies that these CPT-based mod-
els have to be contrived. According to these authors, the
only way CPT can handle order effects is by using the Bal-
lentine (1986) type conditionalization: order of events (“B
follows A” and “A follows B”) is considered a random event
conditioning probabilities of responses. We too consider
this construction awkward (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014b;
see also Section 3), but it is not the only one within the
framework of CPT: the Contextuality-by-Default approach
provides another way, one that is both simple and univer-
sally applicable.
Let us precede our discussion by pointing out that CPT
would indeed be a singularly helpless exercise if it lacked
natural ways to depict the difference between an ordered
pairs of observations (a, b) and an unordered two-element
set {a, b}. The difference between the two is obvious on the
basic set-theoretic level: an ordered pair (a, b) is an abbre-
viation for the set {{a, 1} , {b, 2}}, or {a, {a, b}}, because
of which (a, b) and (b, a) are different sets, unless a = b,
and (a, a) = {{a, 1} , {a, 2}} is different from {a, a} = {a}.
Moreover, since an ordered pair is merely a simple case of a
process (indexed set), the logic of Statement 2 implies that
CPT should resort to contrived constructions when deal-
ing with random processes that are not exchangeable. A
statement from Bruza, Wang, and Busemeyer (2015) may
help in recognizing that the order effects are a non-issue
for CPT. The statement is that in CPT “the intersection of
events is always defined and events always commute, even if
the events are distinguished by time (e.g., ‘A at time 1’ and
‘B at time 2’ is equivalent to ‘B at time 2’ and ‘A at time
1’)” (p. 387). For ordered events it is precisely this com-
mutativity, of ‘A at time 1’ and ‘B at time 2’, that holds
in CPT (and classical logic). In this form it is unchallenge-
able and cannot lead to any problems. An issue is created
when one compares ‘A at time 1’ and ‘B at time 2’ to ‘B
at time 1’ and ‘A at time 2’, two conjunctions that are two
different events that need not have the same probability in
CPT.
However, the approach offered by the Contextuality-by-
Default theory does not consist in labeling events. Rather,
it uses a more versatile labeling of random variables (al-
though the two are essentially equivalent in the simple case
of two consecutive events). To understand the logic of the
approach, consider the probabilistic identity of responses
Rq to some question q. Its domain probability space can
be thought of as a set X of potential responders to the
question q, with some probability measure µ imposed on
its power set (treated as sigma-algebra). Let the possible
values of Rq be Yes/No. Its distribution then is defined by
Pr [Rq = Yes] = µ ({x ∈ X : x responds Yes to q}) . (6)
By construction, q is part of the identity of Rq, so if q is
replaced with another question q′, the random variable Rq
will be replaced with another random variable Rq′ . Prob-
ability theory allows this new random variable to have an-
other distribution, but, of course, being an abstract math-
ematical theory, it does not predict what the distributions
of Rq and Rq′ can be: such a prediction is up to an empir-
ical theory dealing with people’s substantive knowledge of
questions and answers.
Consider now two questions that have identical formula-
tion but are asked in different tones of voice or with different
noise or images in the background; or two questions that
have the same content but differ in how they are formulated
(e.g., “Is it 11 am now?” versus “Is 11 am the correct time
at this moment?”). The usual experimental design, if one is
interested in such differences, would be to partition X into
two subsets X1 and X2, asking the question q in one form
of the members of X1 and in another form of the mem-
bers of X2. From the point of view of abstract probability
theory, whatever the difference between the two questions
substantively, formally the responses to them are two dif-
ferent random variables defined on two different domain
probability spaces. They are, therefore, stochastically un-
related. One can choose (based on one’s substantive, non-
mathematical understanding of questions and answers) to
consider the differences in formulations or in the tone of
voice to be part of the questions themselves (in which case
one will deal with random variables denoted Rq and Rq′)
or to formalize the differences as different contexts in which
one and the same question is asked (in which case one will
present the random variables as Rcq and R
c′
q ). The two
representations are interchangeable, but the latter one is
preferable because, in accordance with the principles of the
Contextuality-by-Default theory, it encodes the stochastic
unrelatedness of Rcq and R
c′
q in the very notation.
2
Using different orders of two questions has precisely the
same logical status as differences in the tone of voice or
background noise: it creates two pairs of jointly distributed
random variables that are stochastically unrelated to each
other. The set X is partitioned into two subsets XAB
and XBA, corresponding to the two orders, (qA, qB) and
(qB, qA). The random variables defined on these subsets
2 A combined notation, such as Rc
q
and Rc
′
q′
, is possible too, as dis-
cussed by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015), but it is less interesting for
subsequent contextuality analysis. As a general principle, it is pos-
sible but counterproductive to include contexts as part of contents
of random variables: strictly separating the two is essential for any
contextuality analysis.
5and corresponding to a given question, say qA, can have
different distributions. The latter is exceedingly obvious if
one uses specially chosen questions. Consider, e.g., qA =“Is
this the first question I am asking?” and qB =“Is this the
second question I am asking?”, asked in two different orders.
By analogy with two forms of the same question, one can
now proceed in several different ways, but the one most in-
formative for contextuality analysis is as follows. We define
a jointly distributed pair
(
RABA , R
AB
B
)
with
Pr
[
RABA = Yes
]
= µ
(
XABA
)
,
Pr
[
RABB = Yes
]
= µ
(
XABB
)
,
Pr
[
RABA = Yes & R
AB
B = Yes
]
= µ
(
XABA ∩X
AB
B
)
,
(7)
where
XABA =
{
x ∈ XAB : x responds Yes to qA
}
,
XABB =
{
x ∈ XAB : x responds Yes to qB
}
.
(8)
The joint distribution for
(
RBAA , R
BA
B
)
, stochastically un-
related to the previous pair, is defined similarly, and can
be arbitrarily different from (7).
Using the Contextuality-by-Default representation, the
system of the random variables just defined is
RABA R
AB
B cAB = (qA, qB)
RBAA R
BA
B cBA = (qB, qA)
qA qB
.
We can now choose some property C for pairs of random
variables, as explained in the previous section, and ask
whether the system above has a C-coupling (or, in the
terminology of Contextuality-by-Default, whether it is C-
noncontextual). With C chosen to mean “are equal with
maximal possible probability,” such a C-coupling exists if
and only if (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a; Dzhafarov, Zhang,
& Kujala, 2015)
∣∣〈RABA RABB
〉
−
〈
RBAA R
BA
B
〉∣∣
≤
∣∣〈RABA
〉
−
〈
RBAA
〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RABB
〉
−
〈
RBAB
〉∣∣ .
(9)
Here, Yes and No responses have been encoded as +1 and
−1, respectively. The remarkable QQ equality discovered
by Wang and Busemeyer (2013) is equivalent to saying that
the left-hand side expression in (9) is zero, from which it
follows that according to this law this system of random
variables is noncontextual.3 See Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cer-
3 Wang and Busemeyer (2013) are right about CPT (they call it
“Bayesian”) not being able to predict the QQ equality, although
they seem to consider this a deficiency rather than a hallmark of
any abstract mathematical theory. Any prediction derived in a
special-purpose theory, such as the quantum formalism used by
Wang and Busemeyer to derive the QQ equality, can be (and always
is, eventually) fully expressed in the language of CPT, making it
possible to relate the prediction to empirical data.
vantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) and Dzhafarov, Zhang,
and Kujala (2015) for a detailed discussion.
3. ON STATEMENT 3
“Classical probability is additive (equiva-
lently, obeys the law of total probability), but
we know from quantum mechanics and from be-
havioral experiments that this additivity (the
law of total probability) can be violated.”
Additivity, expressed in the language of random variables,
is that if A and B are disjoint events in the codomain space
of a random variable R, then
Pr [R ∈ A ∪B] = Pr [R ∈ A] + Pr [R ∈ B] . (10)
This principle is sometimes analyzed in an equivalent form,
referred to as the “law of total probability”: as a conse-
quence of the additivity above and the set-theoretic dis-
tributivity, for any C in the codomain space of R,
Pr [R ∈ C ∩ (A ∪B)]
= Pr [R ∈ C ∩ A] + Pr [R ∈ C ∩B] .
(11)
Set-theoretic distributivity being an integral part of CPT,
and the two equalities above understood as belonging to
CPT, it is logically impossible to claim that one of them
can be violated without stating the same for the other.
This should be kept in mind when encountering statements
about violations of the “classical law ” of total probability.
To give examples: “It was shown that FTP [the formula of
total probability] (and hence classical probability theory)
is violated in some experiments on recognition of ambigu-
ous pictures” (Khrennikov, 2010, p. 90), and “One can find
evidence of violation of laws of classical probability theory,
e.g., in violation of the law of total probability” (Khren-
nikov & Basieva, 2014, p. 105).
We will discuss here the basic form (10) only.
The claim of violations of this law in quantum mechanics
comes from the double-slit experiment. We consider it in
the following version: a source of particles emits them into
a barrier with two slits (left and right, each of which can
be closed or open), and a detector of the particles occupies
a small area behind this barrier. One considers the prob-
ability with which an emitted particle reaches the detec-
tor, and discovers that this probability, when both slits are
open, is not equal to (depending on the detector’s location,
can be greater or smaller than) the sum of these proba-
bilities recorded with only the left slit open and with only
the right slit open. Richard Feynman is often quoted as
saying that this is “a phenomenon which is impossible, ab-
solutely impossible, to explain in any classical way” (Feyn-
man, Leighton, & Sands, 1975, Section 37-1). The words
“in any classical way” in this quote are commonly inter-
preted as “by means of CPT.” This interpretation may be
correct, but it is also possible that Feynman meant that
6this phenomenon cannot be explained by means of classical
mechanics, and that he viewed quantum probabilities as a
special-purpose theory for computing probabilities in a spe-
cific physical situation. The second quote from Feynman
(1951) given at the end of our introductory section seems
to agree with this interpretation.
Whatever the case with Feynman, Ballentine (1986)
presents a systematic analysis of the double-slit experiment
in terms of CPT, and argues that the two are perfectly com-
patible if one treats the probabilities in (10) as conditional
ones, conditioned on three different events. Translating this
into the language of random variables, Ballentine’s solution
is to rewrite (10) as
Pr [R ∈ A ∪B |Q = c◦◦]
generally
6= Pr [R ∈ A |Q = c◦×] + Pr [R ∈ B |Q = c×◦] ,
(12)
where Q is a random variable indicating which of the slits is
open and which is closed: c◦◦ means that both are open, c◦×
means that only the left one is open, and c×◦ means the op-
posite. Clearly, the three conditioning values c◦◦, c◦×, c×◦
are distinct and mutually exclusive (as with any distinct
values of any random variable), whence no equality in (12)
should generally be expected.4
Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014b) call this approach “con-
ditionalization,” in relation to Avis, Fischer, Hilbert, and
Khrennikov (2009) where it was used systematically (see
also Khrennikov, 2006, 2015b). It is true that if R and Q
are jointly distributed, then R conditioned on some value
of Q and R conditioned on another value of Q are two
random variables that possess no joint distributions, i.e.,
are stochastically unrelated. This means that conditional-
ization is a special case of contextual labeling, in fact an
instructive case for introducing the notion of stochastic un-
relatedness (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014b, 2016b). However,
the choice among conditions c◦◦, c◦×, c×◦ need not be ran-
dom. One can conduct an experiment with both slits open
for a year, then for another year with the left slit closed,
4 In a personal communication (April 2018), Jerome Busemeyer ex-
plained to us that when he and his colleagues speak of violations of
the total probability law they do not mean that (10) or (11) fail to
hold. Rather they mean that the probability of an event can be dif-
ferent depending on what other events it is recorded together with.
This can be interpreted as a position very close to Contextuality-
by-Default, or to Ballentine’s conceptualization (12), or even as
the possibility that, say, C when one measures the probability of
R ∈ C ∩A may be a different event from C when one measures the
probability of R ∈ C ∩ (A ∪ B) (the latter case being formulated as
measuring the probability of “C alone” if B = notA). While wel-
coming this clarification, one should note that its implication is that
the law of total probability as a formula of CPT is not violated. Bal-
lentine’s inequality (12) is a correct CPT formula, and something
like Pr [R ∈ C1 ∩ (A ∪B)] = Pr [R ∈ C2 ∩A] + Pr [R ∈ C3 ∩ B] is
not a correct CPT formula. (The latter, incidentally, is a good ex-
ample of why labeling of events, rather than of random variables,
is not a good solution: shall one, in addition to C, also differently
label A and B on the right and on the left of the formula?)
and so on. This should not change anything in the analy-
sis of the double-slit experiment. As we mentioned in the
introductory section, Khrennikov (2009a) pointed out the
difference between contextual and conditional probabilities
in presenting his general Växjö contextual model.5
The analysis of the double-slit experiment within the
framework of the Contextuality-by-Default theory begins
with identifying the random variables in play, their con-
texts and the properties they measure. The contexts are
the same as in Ballentine’s analysis, c◦◦, c◦×, c×◦, but for
completeness we add c×× (both slits closed). The mea-
sured properties are identified by which slit one considers
(left or right) and by its condition (open or closed): q◦· (left
slit, open), q·◦(right slit, open), and similarly for the closed
slits, q×·, q·×. This creates eight random variables that we
can arrange as follows:
R◦◦◦· R
◦◦
·◦ c◦◦
R×◦·◦ R
×◦
×· c×◦
R×××· R
××
·× c××
R◦×◦· R
◦×
·× c◦×
q◦· q·◦ q×· q·×
,
where Rcq can be interpreted as answering the question “Has
the particle just emitted reached the detector through the
slit q under condition c?” The possible values of Rcq are Yes
and No. Thus, R×◦×· =Yes means that a particle reached
the detector having passed through the closed slit on the
left when the right slit is open. Physics (not probability
theory) tells us that the probability of this happening is
zero.
Our arrangement of the random variables shows that,
surprisingly, the system they comprise is formally a cyclic
system of rank 4 (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a; Dzhafarov,
Kujala, & Larsson, 2015; Kujala, Dzhafarov, & Larsson,
2015). It is the same system as the one in the simplest
EPR/Bell “Alice-Bob” paradigm, described in our analysis
of Statement 1. If one uses one’s knowledge that no par-
ticle can reach the detector through a closed slit, then the
joint distributions of all context-sharing pairs of random
variables (the rows of the matrix above) are defined by the
following joint and marginal probabilities:
c◦× R
◦×
·× =Yes
R◦×◦· =Yes 0 p
0
,
c×× R
××
·× =Yes
R×××· =Yes 0 0
0
,
c×◦ R
×◦
·◦ =Yes
R×◦×· =Yes 0 0
q
,
c◦◦ R
◦◦
·◦ =Yes
R◦◦◦· =Yes r
′ r′ + p′
r′ + q′
,
5 In some of his later work, however, Khrennikov seems to have aban-
doned this distinction and adopted a rigorous version of Ballen-
tine’s view (Avis, Fischer, Hilbert, & Khrennikov, 2009; Khren-
nikov, 2015a, 2015b; see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014b, for a critical
discussion of this position).
7where p, q, p′, q′, r′ are some probabilities. The physical in-
terpretation of the joint distribution for c◦◦ compared to
that for, say, c◦× is that, somehow, the way particles reach
the detector having passed through the open left slit may
be different depending on whether the right slit is open
or closed. A physicist may tell us that this is because of
the particle-wave duality and wave interference, but this is
irrelevant for the probabilistic analysis.
It is interesting to see whether the system just described
is C-noncontextual (has a C-coupling) with C=“are equal
with maximal possible probability.” The application of the
general criterion (5) for noncontextuality of such a system
yields
((1− 2p) + (1) + (1− 2q) + (1− 2p′ − 2q′))
−2min ((1− 2p) , (1) , (1− 2q) , (1− 2p′ − 2q′))
≤ 2 + 2|p− p′ − r′|+ | − 1 + 1|
+2|q − q′ − r′|+ | − 1 + 1|,
(13)
where we have assumed that the detector is so small that
the probabilities 1 − 2p, 1 − 2q, 1 − 2p′ − 2q′ are all pos-
itive. By simple algebra one can show that this inequal-
ity is always satisfied, that is, the double-slit system is C-
noncontextual.
Comparing again c◦◦ with c◦× (or c×◦), the noncontex-
tuality just established means, within the framework of
Contextuality-by-Default, that the influence exerted by the
state of a slit (open or closed) upon how the particles reach
the detector having passed through the other slit is of a “di-
rect cross-influence” nature, with no contextuality proper
(Dzhafarov, 2017; Dzhafarov, Cervantes, & Kujala, 2017;
Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2017a). For a detailed contextuality
analysis of the double-slit experiment see Dzhafarov and
Kujala (2018), where it is also shown that a system with
more than two slits may very well be contextual.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this concluding section we will briefly address four
commonly raised concerns about the contextual notation
and the principle that random variables in different con-
texts are different (and stochastically unrelated).
Question: In empirical situations where the contexts
are known not to influence a measurement directly (like
in the EPR/Bell Alice-Bob paradigm with spacelike sep-
aration of the measurements), what “causes” the random
variable representing this measurement to change its iden-
tity?
Answer: The identity of a random variable is deter-
mined by its own distribution and also by the joint dis-
tribution of this random variable with all other random
variables in the same context. Therefore, any change in
these other variables “automatically” changes its identity.
Here is a simple analogy. A person P is in a room with
other people. P has some characteristics, such as “she is
kind,” or “she is tall.” It is possible that she is the tallest
person in the room, in which case she is also characterized
by this fact. The statement “she is the tallest person in
the room” therefore describes a property of P , part of her
identity in addition to her being kind and tall. If one of the
other people leaves, and someone enters who is taller than
P , she “automatically” changes her identity, as she ceases
to be the tallest person in the room. This change in P
occurs even if she is not aware of the change in the room,
or the room is so large that there are no physical means
for her to notice this. As acknowledged in Dzhafarov and
Kujala (2014a), an application of this general argument to
quantum phenomena may be regarded as paralleling an ar-
gument made by Bohr (1935) in reply to the EPR paper
(Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935).
Question: If every condition recorded together with a
random variable can be considered part of its context, does
this not mean that any two realizations of the same ran-
dom variable are in fact two different random variables,
stochastically unrelated to each other?
Answer: If the realizations are separately indexed, e.g.,
by the ordinal position in a sequence of trials, each of them
indeed must be viewed as a single realization of a unique
random variable. There is, however, a choice of the point
of view for subsequent analysis. One can view these unique
random variables as ones with different measured proper-
ties (trial numbers) within a single context (sequence of
trial numbers). Conversely, one can view them as random
variables measuring the same thing (e.g., they all measure
the response of a person to a flash) but in different con-
texts (trial number). We implicitly adopt the second point
of view when we speak of the sequence as one of differ-
ent realizations of “the same” random variable. See Dzha-
farov and Kujala (2015, 2016a) for detailed discussions. In
the case considered, the choice of one of the two points of
view makes no difference. If the realizations are treated
as context-sharing, the random variables are jointly dis-
tributed, but this joint distribution is manifested in a sin-
gle realization only. We need additional assumptions to
reconstruct it, such as stochastic independence, ergodicity,
martingale property, etc. If the realizations are treated
as measuring the same property in different contexts, they
are pairwise stochastically unrelated, and we need to couple
them. The choice of a coupling here amounts to adopting
the same additional assumptions.
Question: Is the contextual labeling with stochastic
unrelatedness really classical, in the Kolmogorovian sense?
Answer: It is a matter of definition and understanding
of history. In some publications one of us and Janne Ku-
jala called our approach a “qualified” Kolmogorovian theory
(Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014c), and it can be presented in a
way that sets it aside from a standard account of CPT (as in
Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016a). However, we prefer to speak
8of Contextuality-by-Default as part of the Kolmogorovian
probability theory, with a greater emphasis on multiple
freely introducible domain probability spaces, stochasti-
cally unrelated random variables defined on these spaces,
and their couplings understood as placing their copies on
the same domain space. This preference is based on our
disbelief that Kolmogorov himself and the brilliant proba-
bilists working in his language could have overlooked the
obvious fact that there cannot exist a joint distribution of
all imaginable random variables. In his celebrated little
book, Kolmogorov (1956, §2 of Chapter 1) discusses empir-
ical applications of his mathematical theory, and in doing
so confines his consideration to a single experiment (corre-
sponding, in our language, to a single context). He may
have erroneously thought this was the only realistic or in-
teresting application. This reading of Kolmogorov is also
advocated in Khrennikov (2009b).
Question: If, however, one posits that in any applica-
tion of CPT all random variables involved are defined on a
single domain probability space, would not then the claim
of the inadequacy of CPT thus understood be justified?
Answer: The issue of the existence of a joint distribu-
tion for all random variables involved in a given application
is not as critical as the issue of what random variables are
involved. Statements 1, 2, and 3 considered above are based
first and foremost on misidentifying the random variables
in play. Thus, the correct system of random variables rep-
resenting the question order experiment is
R =
RABA R
AB
B cAB = (qA, qB)
RBAA R
BA
B cBA = (qB , qA)
qA qB
.
It is simply unjustifiable to posit a priori that it can be
replaced with
R
′ =
RA RB cAB = (qA, qB)
RA RB cBA = (qB, qA)
qA qB
,
a system in which random variables do not change with
context: even if one ignores the logic of Contextuality-by-
Default, there is no rationale for assuming that contexts
are irrelevant, because in this particular example one even
knows that the distributions of RABA and R
BA
A are different
(which is the very “question order effect” that makes this
paradigm interesting). The situation here is no different
from someone deciding to replace R with
R
′′ =
RAB RAB cAB = (qA, qB)
RBA RBA cBA = (qB, qA)
qA qB
,
a system in which random variables do not change with
content.
This reasoning applies even if one views the four ran-
dom variables in the original system R as having an un-
known (and unknowable) joint distribution. This amounts
to informally identifying the system with one of its possi-
ble couplings, and the construction of a C-coupling then
can be presented as determining if this “true” joint distri-
bution could possibly be satisfying C. One can check that
our analysis of the question order effect in Section 2 would
hold with no serious modifications if one adopted this lan-
guage (and similarly for the systems considered in Sections
1 and 3).
There are, of course, good reasons not to use this lan-
guage, except as an informal version of the rigorous lan-
guage of the Contextuality-by Default theory (perhaps for
the sake of conceptual or notational simplicity). The as-
sumption that any two random variables are jointly dis-
tributed is mathematically untenable. It is untenable be-
cause, due to the transitivity of the relation of being de-
fined on the same domain probability space, it implies the
erroneous notion that there is a joint distribution for all
imaginable random variables (for reasons why this notion
is wrong, see Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014a, 2014b, 2017a).
Within the framework of CPT stochastically unrelated ran-
dom variables must exist, making it unjustifiable to assume
without critical examination that all random variables in a
given set have a joint distribution.
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